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Abstract 
This paper examines whether there is information sharing between mutual funds and their 
auditors about the auditors’ other listed firm clients. Using detailed hand-collected data from 
the Chinese market and employing levels, changes, and PSM analyses, we find that mutual 
funds earn higher profits from trading in firms that share the same auditors. The effects are 
more pronounced when firms have a more opaque information environment and when the audit 
partners for the fund and the partners for the listed firm share school ties. The evidence is 
consistent with information flowing from auditors to mutual funds, providing mutual funds 
with an information advantage in firms that share the same auditors. We further find that 
auditors benefit by charging higher audit fees for mutual fund clients and by improving their 
audit quality for listed firm clients. Our study provides evidence of bi-directional information 
sharing between two important market intermediaries. 
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Information Sharing between Mutual Funds and Auditors 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mutual funds and auditors are important stock-market intermediaries. They both demand and 
collect information about listed firms. Mutual funds rely on information to make investment 
decisions, while auditors rely on information to issue appropriate audit opinions. In this paper, we 
investigate whether connected mutual funds and auditors share information about auditors’ clients. 
We refer to a mutual fund and an auditor as “connected” when the auditor audits the mutual fund. 
With this auditor-client relationship, the auditors and the fund managers have many opportunities 
to communicate with each other and to share information about firms. 
First, the information may flow from the auditor to the mutual fund. Auditors perform a variety 
of procedures to reach an appropriate audit opinion (Nelson and Tan 2005; Knechel, Rouse, and 
Schelleman 2009). A significant amount of information about clients is accumulated during the 
audit process, from examining financial documents, communicating with management, and 
exchanging knowledge with other parties. Mutual funds are strongly motivated to gain access to 
such information, as it can be potentially useful for them to make investment decisions. Auditors 
are also incentivized to share information with mutual funds from the perspective of providing 
services to retain fund clients or charge a fee premium. Despite regulations restricting auditors from 
sharing clients’ information with others, previous studies provide evidence of information sharing 
from auditors, even in the U.S. where regulations are among the most stringent (e.g., Aobdia 2015; 
Cai, Kim, Park, and White 2016; Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Litov, and Neyland 2016). Therefore, it is 
possible that information flows from the auditor to the mutual fund.  
Second, the information may also flow from the mutual fund to the auditor. Mutual funds 
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often have a team of professionals hired to examine current and potential investment targets. While 
the auditor has more information sources about its firm clients, mutual funds have an advantage at 
collecting and analyzing industry-wide and macroeconomic information, which is important for 
auditors in assessing clients’ risks, designing audit procedures, and reaching appropriate audit 
opinions (Knechel et al. 2009). Further, auditors may demand evidence and opinions from external 
parties. Overall, mutual funds may share information that is incrementally useful for auditors.  
Using a large sample of data of Chinese mutual funds, auditors, and listed firms during the 
period 2004 to 2016, we examine whether there is information sharing between connected mutual 
funds and auditors (at the audit-office level). The Chinese market provides a powerful setting for 
our research, as the institutional environment is less developed, investor protection is weaker, and 
“guanxi” (or the relationships individuals cultivate with other individuals) is more relied upon by 
various market participants. Further, in China, each individual fund is required to have an auditor, 
which allows us to better control any fund-level invariant factors.1 
Our empirical analyses employ an extensive set of control variables motivated by extant 
research. We use levels, changes, and propensity-score matching approaches, and we control for 
fund-invariant factors by including fund fixed effects. Using detailed hand-collected data, we find 
that mutual funds’ investments in firms that share the same auditors are positively associated with 
future abnormal returns and these effects are more pronounced when the firms’ information 
environment is more opaque. This evidence indicates that mutual funds gain an information 
advantage in firms with shared auditors, suggesting that auditors share information of their clients 
with connected mutual funds. 
                                                          
1 In U.S., the auditor is determined at the fund-company level (Adams, Nishikawa, and Rasmussen 2015).  
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We find that auditors also benefit from information sharing. Specifically, auditors charge 
higher audit fees from mutual-fund clients when they have more valuable information about their 
firm clients, and auditors have higher audit quality for firm clients when connected mutual funds 
have investments in these client firms. Overall, this suggests that mutual funds may provide 
incremental information to auditors.  
We conduct several additional analyses. First, prior studies suggest that mutual funds place 
more bets in securities that they have information advantage. Consistent with this, we show that 
mutual funds invest more heavily in firms that share the same auditors. Second, we find that mutual 
funds trade more in firms with shared auditors, and their trading directions are informative for firms’ 
future operating and stock performance. The evidence is consistent with mutual funds gaining an 
information advantage in firms with shared auditors through information sharing from the 
connected auditors. Third, prior research shows that firms are more likely to withhold bad news. 
Therefore, information sharing from the auditor is likely to be more valuable for mutual funds when 
firms have bad news. Consistent with this logic, we find that mutual funds avoid more trading 
losses from firms with shared auditors when these firms have negative news.2  
Fourth, prior studies suggest that a common educational background fosters social ties and 
results in greater information sharing. Consistent with this, we find that the funds’ trading gains 
from shared office are more pronounced when the fund’s and the firm’s audit partners have a 
common alma mater. Fifth, we conduct robustness tests by excluding observations for which the 
fund company has only one auditor within the year, or by including fund company-year fixed 
effects, and the inferences are unaffected. Finally, our primary definition of auditor is at the audit-
                                                          
2 It is very hard, if not impossible, for mutual funds to short individual stocks in China. 
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office level. When we examine the auditor at the audit-firm level, we find that the results are 
primarily driven by the shared office rather than shared audit firm. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we investigate information 
sharing between two important market intermediaries - mutual funds and auditors. Previous studies 
document that auditors can serve as an information channel when two firms share the same auditor. 
This information channel can mitigate the information asymmetry between the firms and facilitate 
firms’ decisions on important corporate events, such as mergers and acquisitions (Cai et al. 2016; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2016) or supplier selection (Aobdia 2015). These articles focus on two firms and 
common auditors as an information channel. Our study is different by focusing on two 
intermediaries - mutual funds and auditors. Each of them plays a distinctive role in the market and 
shares its own information about firms. In our setting, the auditor is not just an information provider, 
but also benefits from the information sharing by collecting higher fees and increasing its audit 
quality.  
Second, our study identifies a channel through which mutual funds can gain their information 
advantage. Prior research suggests that mutual funds’ information advantage may come from a 
better ability to analyze public information, geographical closeness to firms, site visits, etc. (e.g., 
Coval and Moskowitz 1999, 2001; Dvorak 2005; Cheng, Du, Wang, and Wang 2019). Our study 
suggests that mutual funds can gain an information advantage through information sharing from 
their auditors. Moreover, we provide evidence that the information shared by the auditors is related 
to future stock and operating performance. 
Third, our findings indicate that information from funds can be a supplemental source for the 
auditor. Although auditors have access to their clients’ first-hand documents, the information from 
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funds may help auditors understand more about the industry or macroeconomic environment, thus 
aiding auditors in forming appropriate opinions. We are the first to show that auditors may benefit 
from information sharing from mutual funds. 
Finally, our study adds to the understanding of auditors for the fund industry. Few papers pay 
attention to the auditors of mutual funds. 3  Auditors and mutual funds are both important 
information intermediaries, and each, individually, receives significant attention from academia. 
Our research sheds light on the interaction between these two parties. 
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND  
Features of the Chinese Audit Market  
With the recent growth in the Chinese economy and stock market, the Chinese audit industry 
has expanded rapidly.4 Total audit-fee revenues earned by the 100 largest audit firms in China 
were about 58.4 billion RMB in 2015 according to the Chinese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (CICPA), ranking China among the major audit markets in the world (Gul, Wu, and 
Yang 2013; Gul, Lim, Wang, and Xu 2019).  
Unlike the U.S. market where the Big-4 audit firms have an oligopolistic dominance, the 
Chinese audit market is much less concentrated (Chen, Sun, and Wu 2010; Wang, Yu, and Zhao 
2015; Gul et al. 2019). As a result, fierce competition exists among different audit firms and this 
in turn creates additional pressure for auditors to acquire and retain clients. Meanwhile, the number 
                                                          
3 Goldie, Li, and Masli (2018) examine the effect of audit quality on the investor of bond funds. Adams et al. (2015) 
investigate whether and when a fund-company chooses the same auditor as its parent company. 
4 The audit market in China was established in the early 1980s. Audit firms were initially founded as state owned and 
were affiliated with local or central governments, a university, or a government department until they disaffiliated from 
the government around 1998 and 1999 (DeFond, Wong, and Li 1999). Since then, audit firms have been independent 
entities. 
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of listed firms or other clients - such as mutual funds - in China is small relative to that of qualified 
audit firms. This implies that a buyer’s market is likely to endow clients with more bargaining 
power and impose pressure on auditors fighting for market share (Chen et al. 2010). Besides regular 
contractual auditing services, providing more useful information beyond the scope of an audit may 
be one important way for auditors to retain their clients and charge higher fees.5  
China’s audit market is characterized by a less-developed institutional environment, weak 
investor-protection regime, and low litigation risk. Although the Chinese government has taken 
steps to improve the institutional environment and strengthen regulations in recent years, the 
regulatory and legal structures still fail to provide the same level of investor protection as that in 
more developed markets (Chan, Lin, and Mo 2006; Wang et al. 2015). The low litigation risk 
increases the likelihood of violations of conflict-of-interest rules and highlights the insufficiency 
in protecting clients’ confidential information (providing more credence and power for our 
empirical tests). 
 
Brief Overview of the Mutual-Fund Industry in China  
To strengthen corporate governance and stabilize the stock market, the Chinese government 
made the strategic decision to develop mutual funds as institutional investors in the year 2000. 
Since then, the mutual-fund industry in China has achieved unprecedented growth. During our 
sample period, the number of fund-management companies increased from 36 in 2004 to 106 in 
2016, while the number of mutual funds increased from 141 in 2004 to 2,523 in 2016. The net asset 
value of the mutual-fund industry increased from 246 billion RMB in 2004 to 2,790 billion RMB 
                                                          
5 For example, it is an open secret in China that auditors who provide auditing services will help their client pay lower 
taxes. Such tax-avoidance skills or knowledge may be obtained from auditing other low-tax firms (Lim, Shevlin, Wang, 
and Xu 2018). 
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in 2016.6  
The mutual-fund industry in China is very competitive. Fund managers face high pressure from 
the performance-ranking system and have strong incentives to perform.7 As professional investors, 
mutual funds are supposed to make investment decisions by collecting and analyzing public 
information. However, the information environment in China is characterized by low-quality 
public information and high information asymmetry. Consequently, much of the information is 
acquired through private information channels, such as connections through different social 
networks (Gold, Guthrie, and Wank 2002; Gu, Li, Yang and Li, 2019). In this study, we investigate 
the effects of connections caused by professional relationships between auditors and mutual funds.  
 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Auditors as an Information Intermediary  
By accumulating audit evidence and communicating their findings to information users, 
auditors provide independent assurance of the credibility of accounting information. In turn, this 
improves resource allocation and contracting efficiency. To achieve a sufficient level of assurance 
for the financial statements, auditors need to perform a variety of tasks and audit procedures, such 
as risk assessment, analytical procedures, internal-control evaluations, and substantive tests 
(Nelson and Tan 2005; Knechel et al. 2009). Through these audit procedures and formal/informal 
communication with senior management, auditors accumulate a considerable amount of client 
information (Cai et al. 2016; Dhaliwal et al. 2016). Given that auditors serve multiple clients at the 
                                                          
6 Our sample period begins from 2004 because the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires the 
annual report of mutual fund to be audited since 2004. Note, the data description here is different from that in Table 1 
because we impose additional criteria in our sample selection for the specific research questions. 
7 For example, there is a daily updated ranking for all mutual funds based on performance. 
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same time, it is conceivable that they would share information about different clients among their 
portfolios of clients (Lim et al. 2018).8  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that auditors do share client information even in capital markets 
characterized by strong investor protection. For example, in 2013, a high-ranking KPMG partner 
in Los Angeles leaked confidential information about five different clients, and an Ernst & Young 
partner passed confidential takeover information to a third party (Rapoport 2013). Recent U.S. 
research explores whether auditors act as information intermediaries among their clients. Cai et al. 
(2016) and Dhaliwal et al. (2016) examine the impact of shared auditors on M&A transaction 
outcomes (i.e., both the acquirer firm and the target firm are audited by the same auditor). 
Specifically, Cai et al. (2016) show that a common auditor can help reduce uncertainty throughout 
the acquisition process, resulting in higher-quality M&As in terms of higher announcement returns. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2016) find that target firms are more likely to receive a bid from firms that share 
the same auditor and that deals with a shared auditor are associated with significantly lower deal 
premiums, lower event returns for target firms, higher event returns for acquirer firms, and higher 
deal completion rates. Both studies argue that shared auditors transfer information, unintentionally 
or on purpose, obtained from the auditing process.9  Dhaliwal, Shenoy, and Williams (2017) 
investigate auditor information sharing between supplier and customer firms. They find that 
auditors share information with the supplier and customer, and the information sharing reduces the 
holdup problem and enhances relationship-specific investments. 
                                                          
8 We use the terms auditor sharing, shared auditor, and common auditor interchangeably.  
9 Although information sharing through auditor could be beneficial for the acquirers, it may be at the expense of target 
shareholders. Dhaliwal et al. (2016) argue that the auditors may violate the professional duties and fail to protect 
confidential client information within the audit office to please clients. The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct 
(Section 301) states that “A member in public practice shall not disclose any confidential client information without 
the specific consent of the client.” A similar rule exists in China (Section 2 in the CICPA Code of Professional Conduct). 
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Information Acquisition of Mutual Funds 
Another relevant research stream examines how mutual funds gain an information advantage 
by acquiring private information. A growing literature suggests that institutional investors have an 
information advantage and make profitable investment decisions. For example, Bushee and 
Goodman (2007) show that changes in ownership by institutions with large positions in a firm are 
consistent with informed trading, especially for investment advisors such as mutual funds. Bollen 
and Busse (2001) and Jiang, Yao, and Yu (2007) show that mutual funds exhibit significant timing 
ability. Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2010) provide empirical evidence that mutual funds 
can pick stocks and trade profitably, in part because they can forecast earnings-related 
fundamentals.10,11 
Another line of research suggests that mutual funds obtain an information advantage through 
social connections with other mutual-fund managers, firm management, or analysts. The 
importance of social connections has long been recognized, especially in countries with prevalence 
of “guanxi” and weak legal institutions (e.g., Gu et al. 2019). For example, Hong, Kubik, and Stein 
(2005) document that the holdings and trades of fund managers who work in the same city are 
correlated. Analysts also provide information to mutual funds. Using Chinese data, Gu et al. (2019) 
examine the effects of social connections between financial analysts and mutual-fund managers on 
funds’ decisions. They show that fund managers are more likely to hold stocks covered by socially-
                                                          
10  However, there are also research findings that mutual-fund managers fail to outperform passive benchmark 
portfolios (e.g., Gruber 1996; Carhart 1997). 
11 Further, studies argue that institutional investors can gain an information advantage by investing in geographically 
closer firms (Coval and Moskowitz 1999, 2001; Dvorak 2005; Hau and Rey 2008; Ayers, Ramalingegowda, and Yeung 
2011; Chhaochharia, Kumar, and Niessen-Ruenzi 2012) or through superior understanding of industry information 
(Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 2005). 
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connected analysts and that fund managers make higher profits from such holdings. 
 
Hypotheses 
Mutual funds have strong incentives to search for relevant information about stocks. We argue 
that information sharing from connected auditors can serve as one possible conduit for private 
information transfer to mutual funds. First, auditors have information that is potentially valuable 
for mutual funds. The auditors need to perform a variety of audit procedures to accumulate audit 
evidence. In the process, they gain a deep understanding about the clients’ business through 
examining first-hand financial documents, reviewing board-meeting minutes, participating in 
audit-committee meetings, etc. They have frequent confidential communication with senior 
management and are thus likely to better assess the quality of management team and obtain access 
to material private information (Dhaliwal et al. 2016; Cai et al. 2016). Furthermore, to evaluate the 
company’s ability to continue as a going concern, as required by auditing standards, the auditors 
conduct an evaluation of the company’s future cash flows and operations. Such private information 
is relevant for mutual funds to make investment decisions (Bushee and Goodman 2007; Baker et 
al. 2010; Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang 2018).  
Second, auditors have incentives to share information with mutual funds. Though the funds’ 
auditors are limited with respect to the auditing services they provide, based on the engagement 
letter, they have incentives to provide additional value to the fund client beyond the scope of the 
audit to retain the client and collect associated fees. This is especially the case in China, where the 
audit market is highly competitive. One possible value-added service is to provide relevant 
information to fund clients. In addition, China is characterized as a relationship-based society with 
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low legal risks, making such information sharing more viable. 
There could be several channels through which private information is transferred from the 
auditor to its mutual-fund clients. First, there could be passive communication. As the auditor of a 
mutual fund, a major task is to assure that the fund’s calculation and reporting of net asset values 
(NAVs) is reliable (Goldie et al. 2018).12 The auditor needs to communicate with fund managers 
about the fair values of securities that significantly influence the calculation of NAVs. It is possible 
that, to improve the audit quality for the fund, the auditors will communicate their understanding 
about the value of stocks obtained when they audit these firms and provide confirmation about the 
value of these stocks.13 We consider this type of information transfer as passive as fund auditors 
are not active initiators of the information transfer.  
Second, fund managers can actively acquire private information about the firms in their 
portfolios from the shared auditors. As an investor, it is natural that the mutual funds are concerned 
about the quality of firms’ financial reporting (Chen et al. 2018). An engaged auditor represents a 
first-hand information source for such concerns. Further, the mutual funds have incentives to search 
for additional private information to gain abnormal investing returns. Thus, fund managers may 
actively ask for private information from shared auditors.  
Third, as we discussed before, the fund auditors may actively communicate what they know 
about the firms with fund managers to retain the fund clients in a competitive audit market. Overall, 
information transfers could arise from either passive or active communications between shared 
                                                          
12 In a mutual fund, the NAV (i.e., the value of each share held by the fund) is calculated by dividing the total market 
value of securities, minus any liabilities, by the number of the fund’s shares outstanding (Goldie et al. 2018). The 
calculation of NAVs significantly influences the financial reporting of mutual funds; thus it is important for the auditor.  
13 The auditing standards require that auditors test funds’ fair-value measurements and provide assurance about 
whether NAVs reflect fair-market conditions.  
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auditors and mutual funds.14 
Based on the above discussion, we argue that private information could be transferred from 
connected auditors to mutual funds, giving mutual funds an information advantage in firms that 
share the same auditor. The mutual funds can make use of this information advantage and 
potentially obtain higher profits from trading those stocks (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008; Cao, 
Dhaliwal, Li, and Yang, 2018). We state our first hypothesis as follows:15 
H1: Mutual funds obtain higher trading gains from firms with shared auditors. 
 
When making decisions related to information transfer to connected funds, auditors will trade 
off the relevant costs and benefits. The costs are obvious: the auditors need to consider potential 
litigation and reputation risks as the auditing standards of professional ethics (set by the CICPA) 
require auditors in public practice not to disclose any confidential client information without 
specific consent. Charging higher audit fees could be one of the benefits. DeFond and Zhang (2014) 
note that an audit-fee premium can be compensation for extra audit effort, extra risks, or non-
competitive rents. Auditors who share information may charge a fee premium to compensate for 
the associated risk. Furthermore, if fund clients obtain more private information from the auditor 
and are able to gain abnormal profits from informed trading, the fund clients may be willing to pay 
more for the auditors’ services. Formally, we state the above prediction in the following hypothesis: 
                                                          
14 We note that the audit team for the fund and the audit team for the listed firms usually are not the same. We argue 
that private information is shared within the same audit office. This assumption is reasonable because audit firms are 
knowledge-intensive organizations and they derive competitive advantage through internal information transferring 
(Argote 1999; DeFond and Zhang 2014). Experimental or field research provides evidence of knowledge sharing across 
different audit teams within the audit office (Kennedy, Kleinmuntz and Peecher 1997; Kadous, Leiby and Peecher 
2013). The audit office is where information about clients is concentrated and the individual network is strongest such 
that the opportunity to share information about clients is likely highest (Dhaliwal et al. 2016). Using the setting of 
supply chain or merger and acquisitions, Johnstone et al. (2014) and Dhaliwal et al. (2016) provide evidence consistent 
with information sharing occurring among auditors within the same audit office. 
15 All hypotheses are stated in the alternative form. 
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H2a: Auditors benefit from information sharing by charging higher audit fees for fund 
clients.  
 
During the audit process, the auditors have incentives to seek out relevant independent third-
party information to reduce audit risk and increase audit quality (Cheng, Cheng, Dhaliwal, and 
Kaplan 2015). Consistent with this incentive, prior studies provide evidence that auditor sharing 
between different clients can benefit auditors in terms of greater information about audit risks and 
increased audit quality. Johnstone, Li, and Luo (2014) find that audit quality is significantly higher 
if the auditor perform audits for both the supplier and the customer at the same time. Similarly, 
Chan, Jiang, and Mo (2017) demonstrate that firms sharing the auditor with their main banks have 
higher audit quality due to knowledge spillovers from banks to the auditors. 
 Compared with auditors, mutual funds may not have as detailed information to a specific 
firm. However, as mutual funds invest in a large portfolio of firms, they possess more 
macroeconomic and industry-level information, which is useful in assessing the risks in the 
financial statements (Cici, Gehde-Trapp, Goricke, and Kempf 2018; Knechel et al. 2009). When 
communicating with managers, auditors may be influenced by over-confident managers and a less 
biased (or just a second) opinion from mutual funds may be helpful to reach the appropriate audit 
opinion. Through obtaining information from mutual funds, the auditors can better assess client-
specific risks and design audit procedures. In turn, this can help improve the audit quality. 
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2b: Auditors benefit from information sharing by acquiring more information about the 
listed firm client, resulting in higher audit quality. 
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IV DATA AND SAMPLE  
To promote the healthy development of the mutual-fund industry, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued a rule titled “Information Disclosure for Securities 
Investment Funds.” The rule requires that annual reports of all funds need to be audited starting 
July 1, 2004. To construct our sample, we hand collect funds’ auditor information, including data 
on the engaged audit office and audit fees, from the funds’ annual reports downloaded from the 
CNINFO website.16 We are able to identify the auditor-office information for 10,115 fund-year 
observations and collect audit-fee information for 10,052 fund-year observations. We obtain 
information about the auditor from CSMAR. We define a fund and an audit office as connected 
when the fund is audited by the particular audit office. We define a stock and a fund to have a 
shared auditor if the stock is audited by the same audit office as the fund during the year.  
Our sample period is from 2004 to 2016. We choose this period because the auditor information 
of mutual funds begins in 2004. In addition, the mutual-fund industry in China began to develop 
rapidly since 2004. To construct our sample, we impose the following criteria to the fund-stock-
year observations. First, we include only diversified equity funds, thus excluding other funds such 
as index funds, bond funds, etc.17 Second, we drop observations without auditor information for 
funds or firms. Finally, we drop observations without the necessary information on test and control 
variables for the subsequent regression analyses.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. The number of fund companies increases 
                                                          
16 http://www.cninfo.com.cn is an official website where all listed firms and mutual funds disclose their regular 
(including annual and quarterly) reports. All sample funds are domestic and all listed firms are domestic. 
17 We exclude index funds from our sample because they replicate common share indices. In untabulated analyses, we 
use the index funds sample as a falsification test and find no evidence that shared auditors provide information 
advantage for index funds.  
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from 16 in 2004 to 84 in 2016, and the number of funds increases from 19 to 901. On average, each 
fund company has 11 funds. Within the fund company, the fund can select its engaged auditor. The 
average number of unique auditors for each fund company is 1.34. The number of stocks held by 
funds increased from 264 to 2,309. On average, 4.82% of the fund-stock-year observations can be 
identified as having a shared audit office.  
 
V RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we discuss our research design and empirical tests. First, we examine the 
association between auditor sharing and connected funds’ information advantage, followed by an 
investigation into the specific channels for private-information transfer from shared auditor to 
connected funds. Second, we test funds’ audit fees to explore connected auditors’ benefits due to 
such information transfer. Finally, we analyze the audit quality of firms audited by connected 
auditors. 
 
Auditor Sharing and Funds’ Information Advantage 
Trading Gains  
As discussed, we predict that connected funds can acquire private information from auditor 
sharing. If a mutual fund has an information advantage in stocks with the shared audit office, we 
would expect to observe higher trading gains from trades in these stocks (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; 
Bushee, Gerakos, and Lee 2018; Gu et al. 2019). To test this prediction, we estimate an ordinary 
least squares regression, as shown below:18 
                                                          
18 All variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
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𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽15𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡     (1) 
where Gainsi,j,T is calculated by multiplying the changes in fund j’s holding in firm i from year 
t over the subsequent six-month period by the firm’s buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns during the 
period.19 This variable is constructed following Bushee et al. (2018), and is positive (negative) 
when the fund trades in the correct (opposite) direction of firms’ future returns.20 The variable of 
interest is Shared Officei,j,t, which equals one if stock i and fund j share the same audit office during 
year t, and zero otherwise. Following prior literature (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Bushee et al. 2018; 
Gu et al. 2019), we control for a variety of firm characteristics such as stock-market capitalization 
(Size), analyst following (AnalystFollowing), book-to-market ratio (BM), stock turnover 
(Turnover), accounting performance (ROA), and leverage (Leverage). We also include the firm’s 
stock returns in the past 12 months (Return) and the standard deviation of monthly returns (Std 
Dev). We add an indicator variable to identify state-owned enterprises (SOE) due to well-known 
differences between SOEs and Non-SOEs in China. To capture the audit quality of stocks held by 
funds, we add an indicator variable Top10 that equals one if the stock is audited by a Top-10 auditor 
based on the total audited client assets during the year and zero otherwise.  
In addition, we control for several characteristics of fund families and mutual funds, including 
                                                          
19 In China data are available for all the stock holdings of mutual funds on a semi-annual basis. In untabulated 
sensitivity analyses we have alternatively used a quarterly test period. Only the top-ten stocks are available on a 
quarterly basis, which means the sample size is significantly smaller and less generalizable. However, inferences are 
the same using this smaller sample. 
20 There are two advantages of calculating trading gains following Bushee et al. (2018). First, it is more precise because 
we take the detailed percentage of holding for each stock in the funds’ portfolios into consideration. Second, it captures 
the trading gains for buying stocks and selling stocks simultaneously. The results are similar (and no inferences affected) 
if we use the stock’s six-month BHAR as the proxy for trading gains following Gu et al. (2019). 
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total net assets of the fund (Fund Size) and the fund family (Family Size), and the performance of 
the mutual fund (Fund Performance). We include Holding Size to control for the market value of 
stocks held by the particular fund, and we control for the market value of stocks held by other funds 
in the same fund family (Family Fund Holding) to control for information sharing within the same 
fund family. We include an indicator Same Region to control for a local information advantage of 
a mutual fund.21 Finally, we include year, industry, and fund fixed effects and we cluster standard 
errors by fund.22 
The observations are limited to fund-stock pairs in which the fund holds the stock either at the 
end of year t or at the end of the subsequent semi-annual period. As a result, we can capture the 
trading gains for both buying stocks and selling stocks. We have a sample with 560,697 fund-stock 
pairs over the sample period. Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics. Among the 560,697 
fund-stock pairs across all years, 4.5% have a shared audit office.23 Panel B of Table 2 presents 
the regression results. Column (1) shows the result without fund fixed effects, while Column (2) 
includes fund fixed effects. We find that the coefficients on Shared Office are positive and 
significant at the 1% levels in both specifications.24 The findings indicate that mutual funds make 
higher profits by trading on the stocks with the shared audit office, suggesting that mutual funds 
have an information advantage in these stocks, which is consistent with H1.25 
 
                                                          
21 Alternatively we include a control for same city and no conclusions are altered. 
22 The industry classification is based on the CSRC definitions and includes 21 industries.  
23 The percentage of fund-stock pairs with shared audit office is slightly different from that in Table 1 (4.82%) due to 
additional data requirements (i.e., dropping fund-stock pairs with missing control variables). 
24 After controlling for fund fixed effects, the fund realizes a trading gain that is 10.5 basis points higher over the 
following six months if it shares the same audit office with the invested stock. 
25  In untabulated tests, our fixed-effects structure consists of fund, firm, and industry×year. Our inferences are 
unaffected.  
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Change Analyses 
The results so far are based on associations and could be sensitive to endogeneity concerns, 
in particular, potential omitted factors that simultaneously cause the auditor sharing and funds’ 
trading gains. These tests do include numerous control variables that are motivated by prior 
research and also control for fund fixed effects. In this section, we further use change specifications. 
Specifically, we replace the variables in Equation (1) with the changed versions between the current 
and the lagged periods. We have 677,947 fund-stock pairs over the sample periods for the change 
analyses.26 Table 3 presents the results. The coefficients on Δ Shared Office are positive but are 
not significant. However, when we separate Δ Shared Office into Shared to Non-Shared and Non-
Shared to Shared, we find the coefficient on Non-Shared to Shared is positive and significant at 
the 5% level in both specifications, suggesting that the funds’ trading gains increase significantly 
when the fund-stock pair changes from non-shared audit to shared audit. In contrast, the funds’ 
trading gains are not affected when the fund-stock pair changes from shared audit to non-shared 
audit. We conjecture that the information advantage may still remain for some time after the shared 
auditor has been changed. Overall, the evidence from the change analyses supports our first 
hypothesis, that is, the fund can acquire private information about stocks that share the same auditor. 
 
Propensity-Score Matched (PSM) Sample  
While our change analysis controls for the potential effects of any time-invariant factors 
associated with the auditor sharing and connected funds’ investment outcomes, there could be time-
                                                          
26 In the change analyses, we keep fund-stock pairs for which we can calculate the trading gains in either period t-1 or 
t. That is, the fund needs to have holdings in the stock at the end of period t-2, t-1, or t. In the levels analyses, we keep 
the fund-stock pairs for which we can calculate the trading gains in period t. Therefore, the number of observations for 
the change model is larger than for the levels model.  
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varying factors correlated with the sharing and funds’ performance. To address this possibility, we 
examine the robustness of our findings to matching stocks using PSM with shared auditor to similar 
stocks without shared auditor (i.e., we control for “observables”). For each fund-firm-year, we 
estimate the conditional odds of having shared auditors using a logistic regression model where 
Shared Office is the dependent variable and the firm-level control variables discussed above are 
the independent variables. We then match, without replacement, a stock with shared auditor with a 
stock without shared auditor from the same mutual fund’s portfolios during the same time period 
that has the closest predicted value within a maximum distance of 5 percent.27 
We report the PSM results in Table 4. Columns (1) presents the results without fund fixed 
effects while Columns (2) tabulates the results with fund fixed effects. The coefficients on Shared 
Office are positive and significant at the 5% level across both specifications, suggesting that mutual 
funds obtain higher gains from trading on these stocks. These findings lend further credence to our 
previously reported results. 
 
The Effects of Information Opacity  
We next examine factors that affect the information transfer. The auditors have access to a 
wide range of proprietary client information, and this information is more valuable when firms 
have more opaque information environment (Aobdia 2015). Therefore, we expect the effects of 
information sharing to be more pronounced when the firms are more opaque. To test this prediction, 
we adapt Equation (1) to include an indicator for firms’ information opacity, and an interaction of 
                                                          
27 The resulting sample contains 21,914 fund-stock-year observations with shared audit office and 21,914 fund-stock-
year observations without shared audit office. Our inferences stay the same if we instead use a caliper distance of 0.03 
or 0.07. We also use one-for-three matching and the results are very similar. 
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information opacity with auditor sharing (Shared Office×Opacity). We predict that the coefficient 
on the interaction is positive. Because opacity is inherently difficult to measure, we use five 
measures to proxy for client companies’ information opacity following prior studies: analyst 
following, earnings volatility, related-party transactions (RPT), intangible assets, and whether the 
company is an SOE.28 We also use a composite measure that combines the above five measures. 
Table 5 presents the results from estimating the effects of financial reporting opacity, where 
the results are based on using Fewer Analysts, Higher Earnings Volatility, Existence of RPTs, More 
Intangible Assets, SOE, and Composite Index as proxies for opacity in Columns (1) - (6), 
respectively. We find that the coefficient estimates for Shared Office×Opacity are positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level or better across all specifications. The evidence suggests 
that auditor sharing has a greater impact on funds’ trading gains when the invested companies have 
more opaque information. These findings also further help reduce concerns regarding endogeneity. 
That is, we find that the effects are stronger in subsamples in which we have clear ex-ante reasons 
to expect more pronounced effects. 
 
                                                          
28 Lang, Lins, and Miller (2004) find that analysts play an important oversight and information-processing role and 
thus a lower analyst following indicates greater opacity. Survey evidence indicates that earnings volatility is negatively 
related to earnings predictability and that this view is widely held by management. Consistent with such beliefs, Dichev 
and Tang (2009) provide empirical evidence that earnings volatility can reduce earnings predictability. Therefore, 
higher earnings volatility is indicative of greater opacity. RPTs are a convenient tool used by management to 
manipulate earnings. RPTs can further be employed as a tunneling mechanism used by controlling shareholders to 
expropriate minority interests. Therefore the existence of RPTs can measure the extent of reliance on relationship-
based transactions, which likely lead to financial reporting opacity (Gu et al. 2019). Gu and Lev (2017) show that the 
gains from predicting corporate earnings have been shrinking over the past 30 years due to the increased prevalence of 
intangible assets. Furthermore, intangible assets can capture the complexity of firms’ information and reduce 
institutional investors’ informed trading (Bushee et al. 2018). In China, SOEs enjoy preferential treatment in the 
financial market and lack the incentives to disclose high-quality public information (Wang, Wong, and Xia 2008). 
Therefore, we use SOEs to proxy for the extent of financial reporting opacity. Please refer to the Appendix for the 
detailed definitions of opacity.  
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Connected Auditors’ Benefits: Audit-Fee Analyses 
So far, we have provided evidence that auditor sharing relates to information transfer and that 
connected funds can acquire private information from a shared audit office and obtain higher 
trading gains. In this section, we examine one of benefits that the connected auditors can receive, 
audit fees. We conduct audit-fee analyses at the fund level using this model: 
𝐿𝑛𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑗,𝑡(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑗,𝑡) + β2𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + β3𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡
+ β4𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + β5𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + β6𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + β7𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑝 10𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡      (2) 
where LnFeej,t is the natural logarithm of audit fees of fund client j in year t. For each fund-year 
observation, we calculate the number or the market value of firms that share the same auditor with 
the fund during the year. When a connected auditor audits more firm clients, or larger firm clients, 
the information shared by the auditor would be more valuable. Therefore, we expect these auditors 
to receive higher audit fees from the fund client.  
We include a number of variables to capture other factors that may contribute to the fund’s 
audit fees, such as fund size, fund performance, family size, and family performance. In addition, 
we control the auditor’s tenure for fund auditing (Auditor Tenure) and whether the auditor is Top 
10 or not (Fund Top10) based on the ranking of total audited client assets during the year. Finally, 
we include year (and fund) fixed effects in the model.  
The results are reported in Table 6. The coefficients on Connected Firms and Connected Firm 
Value are positive and statistically significant at the 10% level or better in all specifications, 
suggesting that the fund auditor can charge higher audit fees as a benefit to transfer private 
information. The results suggest an economic reason why shared auditors are willing to transfer 
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information to their fund clients.29 
We further analyze whether the auditor-sharing effects on funds’ trading gains vary with the 
funds’ audit-fee level. We add interactions between Shared Office and proxies for high audit fees 
by funds in the regression model. High Fee equals one if the funds’ audit fees are greater than the 
sample median value during the year and zero otherwise. Because audit fees are a rough measure 
that includes compensation for extra audit effort and residual audit risk (DeFond and Zhang 2014), 
we further employ abnormal audit fees. Here, abnormal fees are calculated using the model in Table 
6 (excluding Connected Firms and Connected Firm Value), and the abnormal fees are the residuals 
from the regression. High Abnormal Fee equals one if it is greater than the sample median during 
the year and zero otherwise.  
The results are presented in Table 7. The dependent variables are trading gains. The coefficients 
on the interactions between Shared Office and proxies for high fund audit fees are positive and 
significant at the 5% level or better, suggesting the funds’ high audit fees can amplify the auditor-
sharing effects on funds’ trading gains. In other words, high audit fees may be one of the economic 
incentives for shared auditors to transfer private information about firms to connected funds.30 
Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that high audit fees are an important reason for 
shared auditors’ information transferring to mutual-fund clients.  
 
Connected Auditors’ Benefit: Audit-Quality Analyses 
Another possible benefit for the connected auditors to transfer information is that they can 
                                                          
29 Based on the coefficient estimates in Column (2), moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of Connected Firm 
Value is associated with an increase of 1.678 in LnFee (0.002×(8.64-0.25)×100), or 14.93 percent of its sample mean. 
30 We alternatively use absolute values of stock trading as the dependent variable. The coefficients on the interactions 
are positive and significant at the 5% level or better (untabulated). The results indicate that the funds’ high audit fees 
can strengthen the auditor-sharing effects on funds’ trading volume. 
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obtain private information from funds that help them reduce audit risks and improve the audit 
quality. We examine the auditor-sharing effects on firms’ audit quality in this section. Specifically, 
we construct a sample of firm-year observations for firms that are held by at least one mutual fund 
and run the following regression: 
𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + β2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + β2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + β4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + β5𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ β6𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + β7𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + β8𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + β9𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + β10𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + β11𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ β12𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + β13𝑇𝑜𝑝 10𝑖,𝑡 + β14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (3) 
The dependent variable is audit quality. We use three common measures for audit quality. 
AbsDA_DD is the absolute value of abnormal accruals following Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
AbsDA_KWL is the absolute value of abnormal accruals following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 
(2005), and Irregularity is the existence of financial reporting irregularities.31 Our variable of 
interest is Fund Office, an indicator that equals one if firms share a common audit office with at 
least one of the mutual funds that hold the stocks of the company and zero otherwise. We include 
several control variables based on prior research (Gul et al. 2013; Li, Qi, Tian, and Zhang 2017).32  
We report the results in Table 8. Panel A reports descriptive statistics. 11.5% of sample firms 
display financial reporting irregularities during our sample period. 12.3% of firms have at least one 
common audit office with the mutual funds that hold the stocks of companies. The distribution of 
other variables is comparable to prior literature (e.g., Gul et al. 2013; Li et al. 2017). Panel B reports 
                                                          
31  Specifically, Irregularity is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm conducted financial reporting fraud 
sanctioned by regulators (i.e., the CSRC, MOF, or stock exchanges in China) in the subsequent periods, and zero 
otherwise (source: CSMAR). These cases are similar to the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases in the U.S. 
32 Earnings quality is affected by financial characteristics such as operating performance, debt, growth, and size, 
therefore, we control for the following time-varying firm characteristics: the log value of total assets (LnAsset), return 
on assets (ROA), the leverage ratio (Leverage), the presence of loss (Loss), the ratio of sales to assets (Sales Turnover), 
the book-to-market ratio (BM), the ratio of receivables and inventory to assets (RECINV). Following Li et al. (2017), 
we include operating cash flows (CFO), sales growth (Growth), and stock returns during the year (Return). We add 
listing age (Age) based on Gul et al. (2013). Finally, we control the Top-10 audit-firm effect (Top10) and the percentage 
of shares held by mutual funds (Fund Share). As before, we include year and industry fixed effects in this firm-year 
model. 
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the regression results. We find that the coefficients on Fund Office are negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better across all specifications, suggesting that the auditors can 
improve the audit quality of the firms if the firms and the mutual funds that hold their stock share 
a common audit office.33 
 
VI ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Auditor Sharing and Holding Decision 
In this section, we examine whether auditor sharing affect mutual funds’ holding decision. 
Prior literature suggests that funds will invest more in securities that they have information 
advantage (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Bushee et al. 2018; Gu et al. 2019). When funds have 
information advantage in some securities, the future expected returns from trading those securities 
will be higher. In our setting, this suggests that mutual funds will put more weight on firms that 
share the same auditors. We estimate the following regression model: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽15𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡               (4) 
in which, subscripts i, j, t denote stock i, fund j, and year t, respectively. Proportioni,j,t is the 
percentage of fund j’s holding amount for stock i as a fraction of the fund’s NAV during year t.34 
                                                          
33 Another possible alternative explanation for our audit-quality results is that the mutual funds provide industry-level 
or macroeconomic information directly to the companies, resulting in higher earnings quality. However, one of the 
assumptions for such possibility is that the mutual funds have sufficient incentives and ability to push the listed firms 
to increase earnings quality or audit quality. In untabulated analyses, we examine a sample in which mutual funds have 
less than 5% (or even 2%) ownership of the listed firms’ shares. These mutual funds should have no incentives or 
ability to influence the listed firms. Our conclusions still hold.  
34 We consider Proportion to be both intuitive and directly related to our research question. However, in additional 
analyses we replace Proportion with an indicator equal to one if the connected stock is one of the top-10 holdings of 
the fund. Conclusions are unaltered with this alternative outcome variable (untabulated). 
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The sample contains stocks that are held by any fund at the end of the year. To increase the power 
of our test, we require the fund to have invested in at least one stock with a shared audit office and 
at least one stock without a shared audit office during the year (Cheng et al. 2019).35 Shared 
Officei,j,t equals one if stock i and fund j share the same audit office during year t, and zero otherwise. 
The definitions of control variables are similar to those in Equation (1). 
Table 9 reports the regression results for Equation (4). Column (1) provides results without 
controlling for fund fixed effects. The coefficient on Shared Office is positive and significant at the 
1% level (0.203, t-value=9.404), suggesting that the fund holds more stocks with a shared audit 
office. This conclusion holds after including fund fixed effects in Column (2) (0.068, t-
value=4.348).36 Overall, the evidence is consistent with the notion that funds acquire more private 
information of firms that share the same auditor and, for this reason, they hold more stocks in these 
firms ex ante.37 
 
Auditor Sharing and Funds’ Trading Behavior  
How will mutual funds make use of their information advantage in firms with shared auditors? 
First, mutual funds may trade more actively in these firms. Bushee et al. (2018) find that local 
institutional investors have larger trading activities at the time when they have information 
advantage from the management. Second, mutual funds can shift their portfolio weights in advance 
of the public disclosure of information. Previous studies assess the extent of institutional investors’ 
information advantage by examining whether the change in stock holdings is predictive of the 
                                                          
35 Our results stay the same if we include these observations.  
36 The effect of auditor sharing is economically significant. Compared with firms with non-shared auditor, mutual 
funds on average invest 7.06% (=0.069/0.977) more in firms with shared auditors. 
37 Similar to the trading-gains tests, we also employ a changes model and PSM specification for the holding decision 
and our inferences hold.  
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upcoming earnings (e.g., Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Chen, Harford, and Li 2007; Cheng et al. 
2019). In this section, we conduct analyses to shed light on how mutual funds utilize the 
information advantage from auditor sharing. Specifically, we examine whether funds’ stock-
holding changes relate to auditor sharing and to future performance.38 The regression models are:  
∆𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽15𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡              (5) 
∆𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽17𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽18𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽19𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡            (6) 
where ΔHoldingi,j,t is defined as the fund j’ stock-holding changes in firm i from lagged six months 
to year t. Shared Office is as previously defined. Following prior studies, we use three measures to 
proxy for future performance announcements (Chen et al. 2007; Cheng et al. 2019): the change in 
ROA (△ROA), unexpected earnings (UE), and subsequent six-month buy-and-hold size-adjusted 
stock returns (BHAR). We interact the performance measures and Shared Office in Equation (6), 
and the coefficients on the interactions capture the auditor-sharing effects on the funds’ informed 
trading. 
Panel A of Table 10 reports the results for Equation (5). In Column (1), we estimate the auditor-
                                                          
38 The change of stock holding is defined in a 6-month period, that is, we compare the shareholding in the current 
period with that from 6 months ago. We do this because the funds disclose detailed holding information in semi-annual 
and annual reports. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3313541 
27 
 
sharing effects on the absolute magnitude of funds’ stock trading. The coefficient on Shared Office 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the funds trade more if they 
share the same audit office with the invested stocks. In Columns (2) and (3), we separate the trading 
into net buying stocks and net selling stocks, respectively. The significant coefficients on Shared 
Office indicate that the funds both buy more stocks and sell more stocks if they share the same audit 
office with the concerned stocks. 
Panel B reports the results for Equation (6). The coefficient estimates for the interaction of 
Shared Office and future performance (i.e., β3) are positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level in Columns (1) and (2) and at the 10% level in Column (3). The results suggest that the 
changes in connected funds’ holding of the stocks with the shared audit office are more predictive 
of the invested firms’ future performance than those of non-connected funds. This is consistent 
with the notion that connected funds acquire private information about firms’ operating 
performance from the connected auditor, and then trade the stocks based on the information. 
 
Negative Information and Auditor-Sharing Effects 
There are reasons to believe that the effects of information sharing will be more pronounced 
when firms have negative information. Managers have strong incentives to withhold bad news due 
to career and/or compensation concerns (e.g., Berger and Hann 2007; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 
2009). Therefore, information asymmetry between firms and outsiders, such as mutual funds, is 
likely more severe when firms have bad news and this is the situation in which information sharing 
from a connected auditor becomes more valuable. 
To examine our prediction, we adjust Equation (1) to include a proxy for firms’ negative 
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information and interact it with the auditor-sharing indicator. Negative is an indicator that equals 
one if the firm’s operating performance (measured using ROA) declines in the upcoming earnings 
announcement and zero otherwise.39 The results are reported in Table 11. The results for auditor-
sharing effects on funds’ trading gains in the subsample of negative information and positive 
information are presented in Columns (1) and (2), respectively. In both specifications, the auditor 
sharing significantly increases the connected funds’ trading gains. However, the positive and 
significant coefficient on Shared Office × Negative in Column (3) is consistent with our prediction 
that the effects are stronger when firms report negative information. This empirical evidence also 
helps differentiate auditor-sharing effects from other social-network effects documented in prior 
studies because information sharing from managers is more significant when firms have good news 
(e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Gu et al. 2019).40 
 
Effects of Social Ties between the Fund’s Audit Partners and the Firm’s Audit Partners  
We argue that private information is shared within the same audit office. Experimental and 
field research provide evidence of knowledge sharing across different audit teams within the audit 
office (Kennedy et al. 1997; Kadous et al. 2013; Cai et al. 2016). But we note that the audit team 
for the fund and the audit team for the listed firms usually are not the same. This fact could limit 
the information sharing among audit partners within the same office. In this section, we explore 
whether the potential information sharing varies with the additional social ties among the partners 
auditing the fund and the firm within the same office. Social ties are important across the globe and 
                                                          
39 Our test is based on the upcoming semi-annual earnings release. No conclusions are altered if we use an annual 
period instead. 
40 Ex ante, the information advantage will motivate mutual funds to invest more in stocks with shared auditor. Ex post, 
if the information is received, mutual funds will invest more in firms with positive information and dispose of firms 
with negative information.  
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considered critical in China (e.g., Cheng and Rosett 1991; Bian 1997). 
Following Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) and Guan, Su, Wu, and Yang (2016), we focus 
on school ties arising from sharing an educational link. Individuals who attended the same schools 
are likely to have the same background and similar interests (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 
2001).41  Therefore, we expect that partners within the same office are more likely to share 
information when they also have school ties. As a result, we expect the information sharing between 
mutual funds and connected auditors to be more pronounced when the audit partners have school 
ties.  
To test our prediction, we hand-collect school information for individual audit partners.42 
Then we partition Shared Office into two variables: Shared Office ties, which equals one if partners 
auditing the fund and the firm within the same office have a common alma mater and zero otherwise; 
Shared Office no ties, which equals one if the partners do not have a common alma mater and zero 
otherwise. The results are reported in Table 12.43 In Columns (1) and (2), we find that both 
coefficients on Shared Office ties and Shared Office no ties are positive and significant at the 5% level 
or better.44 An F-test shows that the difference between the estimated coefficients of Shared Office 
ties and Shared Office no ties is significant in both columns (two-sided p-value=0.0180 and 0.0117, 
respectively). The results suggest that the additional social ties among partners can amplify the 
                                                          
41 Connections forged through school ties enjoy enhanced interaction via in-jokes, shared traditions, and a sense of 
group belonging, as evidenced by alumni networks, newsletters, donations, and college sports events. Prior studies 
suggest that a common educational background fosters social ties and result in greater information sharing. Socially 
connected people tend to follow communal norms that promote mutual caring and trust (Silver 1990; Cohen et al. 2010; 
Guan et al. 2016). Moreover, interactions and greater comfort between individuals allow connected agents to better 
communicate subtle and sensitive information that would otherwise not be shared (Granovetter 2005). 
42 The personal information of individual audit partners in China is publicly available on the website of the China 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) at www.cicpa.org.cn 
43 In the subsample where the mutual fund and listed company share the same office (Shared Office=1), 5% have such 
school ties.  
44 The sample size is smaller in Table 12 because we drop the 519 and 762 observations where all the fund’s and 
firm’s partners’ school information are missing when the mutual fund and listed firm share the same office. The results 
are very similar if we classify them as no school ties.  
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information sharing between mutual funds and connected auditors. 
 
Shared Audit Firm versus Shared Audit Office 
We use a common audit office between the mutual fund and firm to proxy for auditor sharing. 
The underlying argument is that the audit office is where the client information is concentrated 
(e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2016). As a robustness check, we investigate whether audit-firm sharing can 
cause information transfer in our setting. Shared Audit Firm indicates whether the mutual fund and 
the company share the same audit firm during the year. Further, we separate the shared audit firm 
into two variables: Shared Office (as defined before) and Shared Audit Firm Not Office (that equals 
one if the fund and the company share the same audit firm but not the same audit office and zero 
otherwise). Panel A of Table 13 reports the descriptive statistics for three key variables. 4.9% of 
fund-stock pairs share the same audit firm and 4.5% share the same audit-firm office, while only 
0.5% of them share the same audit firm but not audit office.45 We report the regression results in 
Panels B. The coefficients reported in Column (1) on Shared Audit Firm are positive and significant 
at the 5% level. Further analyses reported in Columns (2) show that the coefficients on Shared 
Office are positive and highly significant, while the coefficient on Shared Audit Firm Not Office is 
insignificant. Overall, the results indicate that audit-office sharing is especially important and 
relates to information transfer from auditors to mutual funds. 
 
Potential Confounding Effects of Fund Family 
Prior research suggests that the information used in investment decisions is shared among funds 
                                                          
45 The reason for the unbalanced distribution is that most of mutual funds in China are located in big cities such as 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, and the audit firms are more likely to have offices located in these cities. 
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within a fund family (Elton, Gruber, and Green 2007). To exclude the possibility that our results 
are driven by information sharing within the same fund-management company, we first exclude 
the fund-stock pairwise observations where all the funds within the fund family are audited by the 
same auditor and rerun the regressions. Untabulated results show that the coefficient on Shared 
Office is still positive and significant (at the 1% level), indicating that our results are not driven by 
information sharing within the fund family. Second, we include fund company-year fixed effects to 
control for the potential effects of unobservable time-varying fund-company characteristics and 
our results still hold. We conclude that our inferences are robust to considering potential 
information sharing within the fund company. 
 
Alternative Explanations  
Although we address the possibility of endogeneity stemming from the matching between audit 
clients and auditors using fixed effects models, change analyses, and PSM, there are still alternative 
explanations that potentially drive our results. First, mutual funds may have a preference for the 
auditor that audits the companies they invest in (“preference explanation”). If mutual funds 
influence invested companies (which they believe will outperform) to hire the auditors that also 
audit the mutual funds, we may also observe that a shared auditor is associated with higher trading 
gains that are not caused by information sharing. However, the assumption for this alternative 
explanation is that the mutual funds have sufficient ability to influence the auditor choice of the 
companies they invest in. In our sample, the mutual funds only hold 0.11% (0.18%) of listed 
companies’ total outstanding shares on average. In untabulated tests, we exclude the observations 
for which the mutual funds hold more than 5% (2%, or even 1%) of shares of listed companies and 
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our conclusions stay the same. Therefore, our results are not likely to be driven by such “preference 
explanation.”  
Another theoretical possibility is that the mutual funds just have greater faith in the audit 
opinions of their own auditors, as a result, the fund managers are more likely to invest in well-
performing firms that are audited by shared auditors and obtain higher trading gains (“greater faith 
explanation”). However, if such possibility drives our results, the effects of shared auditors on 
mutual funds’ trading gains should be more pronounced for listed companies with forthcoming 
positive information or at least no difference for companies with forthcoming positive or negative 
information. However, we find that the effects of shared auditors are more pronounced for 
companies with forthcoming negative information because such negative information is more 
likely to be withheld by the companies. Therefore, our results are unlikely to be caused by such 
“greater faith explanation.” 
 
 
VII CONCLUSIONS 
We examine whether mutual funds and their auditors share information about the auditors’ 
clients. Although regulators put restrictions on auditors’ ability to share clients’ information, such 
information sharing can potentially benefit both mutual funds and auditors. Using a large and hand-
collected Chinese sample, we find that mutual funds’ trading in the stocks that share the same 
auditors with them earns greater profits and that these effects are more pronounced when the firms 
are more opaque. We further find that mutual funds invest more in these stocks and trade more in 
these firms, and that their trading is associated with the future operating performance of these firms. 
The evidence suggests that information about firms with shared auditors flows from connected 
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auditors to mutual funds, which enhances funds’ informational advantage in these firms. 
We also find evidence that connected auditors receive higher audit fees from mutual funds 
when the information sharing is more likely, suggesting that the auditor benefits from the 
information sharing. Similarly, we show that connected auditors increase their audit quality, which 
is consistent with the mutual funds providing relevant information to the auditor. Overall, our study 
provides evidence of bi-directional information sharing between two important market 
intermediaries.  
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Year 
 
# of Fund 
Companies 
 
# of 
Funds 
# of unique 
funds for each  
fund company 
# of unique 
auditors for each 
fund company 
 
Stocks held 
by funds 
 
Fund-Stock 
Observations 
 
Fund-Stock with 
Shared Auditor 
 
Percent of Fund-Stock 
with Shared Auditor 
2004 16 19 1.32 1.12 264 802 72 8.98% 
2005 18 28 1.71 1.20 370 1393 103 7.39% 
2006 29 50 2.32 1.19 496 2413 159 6.59% 
2007 40 92 3.11 1.30 609 5048 286 5.67% 
2008 54 192 5.19 1.29 679 10936 613 5.61% 
2009 54 228 5.61 1.34 957 15420 737 4.78% 
2010 56 264 6.91 1.35 1,122 18625 1,004 5.39% 
2011 56 313 7.72 1.40 1,178 21329 1,234 5.79% 
2012 61 412 9.40 1.35 1,622 33023 1,697 5.14% 
2013 62 469 10.14 1.35 1,811 40104 1,719 4.29% 
2014 65 497 11.39 1.38 2,077 46986 2,010 4.28% 
2015 67 419 10.60 1.26 2,134 40193 2,069 5.15% 
2016 84 901 18.96 1.44 2,309 74506 3,262 4.38% 
Total  662 3884 11.02 1.34 15,628 310,778 14,965 4.82% 
 
This table describes the yearly distribution of the sample after dropping fund-stock observations without necessary variables for the subsequent regressions of holding decisions.  
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Table 2: Shared Auditors and Funds’ Trading Gains 
This table presents the regression results of funds’ trading gains on shared auditor between fund 
and listed firms held by the fund based on the following regression: 
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽16𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡     
The dependent variable is trading gains, which is measured as the semi-year change in 
percentage of shares outstanding held by fund multiplied by the buy-and-hold size-adjusted 
returns over the subsequent semi-year period. The units of analysis are fund-stock-years. Only 
stocks that are held by fund at the end of the year or at the end of the subsequent semi-year are 
included in this sample. The sample contains 560,697 fund-stock pairs across all the years in 
the sample period after dropping observations without necessary variables used in the 
regression analysis. The definitions of the variables are shown in the Appendix. The t-values in 
parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for fund-level clustering. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
VARIABLES N Mean Std Dev P25 P50 P75 
Gains 560,697 0.015 5.605 -0.112 0.000 0.117 
Shared Office 560,697 0.045 0.206 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Size 560,697 16.500 1.029 15.780 16.430 17.140 
Analyst Following 560,697 2.628 0.983 2.197 2.890 3.367 
BM 560,697 0.525 0.267 0.307 0.486 0.730 
ROA 560,697 0.068 0.065 0.026 0.057 0.098 
Leverage 560,697 0.469 0.201 0.314 0.476 0.629 
Turnover 560,697 4.294 3.237 1.914 3.414 5.768 
Return 560,697 0.282 0.713 -0.181 0.089 0.528 
Std Dev 560,697 0.137 0.060 0.098 0.125 0.161 
SOE 560,697 0.533 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Top10 560,697 0.615 0.487 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Fund Size 560,697 20.600 1.849 19.230 20.760 22.040 
Family Size 560,697 24.270 1.181 23.600 24.380 25.080 
Fund Performance 560,697 0.099 0.331 -0.097 0.034 0.230 
Holding Size 560,697 10.730 6.854 0.000 13.490 16.010 
Family Fund Holding 560,697 19.910 3.203 19.180 20.470 21.530 
Same Region 560,697 0.120 0.325 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Panel B: Regression Results  
  (1) (2)  
VARIABLES Dependent Variable = Trading Gains  
Shared Office 0.113*** 0.105***   
(2.850) (2.668)  
Size 0.048** 0.058***   
(2.530) (2.711)  
Analyst Following 0.026*** 0.021**   
(2.643) (2.153)  
BM 0.118** 0.159***   
(2.035) (2.712)  
ROA 0.461** 0.447*   
(2.012) (1.917)  
Leverage -0.162*** -0.179***   
(-2.915) (-3.179)  
Turnover 0.015*** 0.016***   
(4.804) (4.920)  
Return -0.026 -0.036   
(-1.074) (-1.470)  
Std Dev 0.097 0.106   
(0.503) (0.542)  
SOE 0.001 0.001  
 (0.034) (0.038)  
Top10 0.025 0.026*  
 (1.606) (1.669)  
Fund Size 0.015** 0.058**   
(2.227) (2.136)  
Family Size 0.007 0.038   
(0.861) (0.808)  
Fund Performance -0.005 -0.058   
(-0.047) (-0.396)  
Holding Size -0.018*** -0.017***   
(-8.561) (-7.485)  
Family Fund Holding 0.002 -0.001   
(0.498) (-0.331)  
Same Region 0.010 0.006   
(0.366) (0.245)  
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  
Fund Fixed Effects  No Yes  
Observations 560,697 560,697  
Adjusted R-squared 0.005 0.009  
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Table 3: Change Analyses  
 
This table presents the change analysis results of the role of shared auditors in influencing funds’ 
holding decisions and trading gains based on the following regression: 
∆𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6∆𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7∆𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8∆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9∆𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11∆𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13∆𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽15∆𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽16∆𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽17𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The dependent variable is change in Trading Gains. The units are fund-stock-years. The sample 
contains 677,947 fund-stock pairs in the trading gains model across all the years in the sample 
period after dropping observations without necessary variables used in the regression analysis. 
The definitions of the variables are shown in the Appendix. The t-values in parentheses are 
based on standard errors adjusted for fund-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Dependent Variable = Δ Gains 
Δ Shared Office 0.118  0.122   
(1.167)  (1.198)  
Shared to Non-Shared  0.142  0.139 
  (1.004)  (0.977) 
Non-Shared to Shared  0.335**  0.338** 
  (2.166)  (2.182) 
Δ Size -0.187*** -0.186*** -0.181*** -0.180***  
(-5.627) (-5.601) (-5.398) (-5.374) 
Δ Analyst Following 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.049***  
(3.225) (3.228) (3.504) (3.505) 
Δ BM 0.680*** 0.678*** 0.675*** 0.674***  
(4.021) (4.014) (3.961) (3.954) 
Δ ROA -0.529* -0.534* -0.533* -0.538*  
(-1.692) (-1.708) (-1.708) (-1.724) 
Δ Leverage -0.437*** -0.438*** -0.442*** -0.443***  
(-3.383) (-3.391) (-3.405) (-3.414) 
Δ Turnover 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004  
(0.901) (0.898) (1.012) (1.008) 
Δ Return 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.075***  
(3.235) (3.220) (3.095) (3.082) 
Δ Std Dev 0.100 0.106 0.101 0.107 
 (0.465) (0.491) (0.464) (0.490) 
Δ SOE 0.018 0.019 0.015 0.015  
(0.129) (0.129) (0.103) (0.104) 
Δ Top10 -0.050 -0.052 -0.051 -0.053 
 (-1.272) (-1.335) (-1.295) (-1.359) 
Δ Fund Size 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.017  
(0.586) (0.592) (0.506) (0.506) 
Δ Family Size -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.107** -0.107**  
(-2.606) (-2.611) (-2.381) (-2.383) 
Δ Fund Performance -0.087 -0.087 -0.123 -0.123  
(-1.267) (-1.265) (-1.424) (-1.418) 
Δ Holding Size -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022***  
(-9.172) (-9.168) (-9.073) (-9.070) 
Δ Family Fund Holding 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***  
(8.588) (8.588) (8.384) (8.385) 
Same Region 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019  
(1.332) (1.224) (1.304) (1.200) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 677,947 677,947 677,947 677,947 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
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Table 4: Propensity-Score Matching 
This table presents the regression results of the role of shared auditors in influencing funds’ 
holding decisions and trading gains based on the Equation (1) and (2) using propensity score 
matched sample. The dependent variable is trading gains, which is measured as the semi-year 
change in percentage of shares outstanding held by fund multiplied by the buy-and-hold size-
adjusted returns over the subsequent semi-year period. The units are fund-stock-years. The 
sample contains 43,828 fund-stock-year observations in the trading gains model across all the 
years in the sample period. The definitions of the variables are shown in the Appendix. The t-
values in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for fund-level clustering. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests. 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Dependent Variable = Trading Gains 
Shared Office 0.140** 0.144**  
(2.291) (2.313) 
Size 0.157*** 0.196***  
(3.119) (3.465) 
Analyst Following -0.057 -0.078*  
(-1.452) (-1.878) 
BM -0.012 0.121  
(-0.062) (0.569) 
ROA -0.378 -0.093  
(-0.432) (-0.102) 
Leverage -0.379 -0.358  
(-1.399) (-1.237) 
Turnover -0.019 -0.020  
(-1.309) (-1.311) 
Return -0.256*** -0.282***  
(-2.919) (-3.039) 
Std Dev 1.656** 1.534**  
(2.306) (2.032) 
SOE 0.097 0.128* 
 (1.335) (1.655) 
Top10 -0.001 -0.028 
 (-0.003) (-0.112) 
Fund Size 0.061*** 0.203**  
(3.107) (2.281) 
Family Size 0.003 0.195  
(0.129) (1.233) 
Fund Performance -0.389 -0.652*  
(-1.312) (-1.713) 
Holding Size -0.045*** -0.044***  
(-6.639) (-5.760) 
Family Fund Holding 0.015 0.006  
(0.798) (0.302) 
Same Region 0.003 -0.004  
(0.036) (-0.036) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects  No Yes 
Observations 43,828 43,828 
Adjusted R-squared 0.012 0.041 
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Table 5: The Effect of Firms’ Opacity on Fund’s Trading Gains (Channel Test) 
 
This table presents the regression results of effects of listed firms’ opacity on association 
between funds’ trading gains and shared auditor between fund and listed firms held by the fund 
based on the following regression: 
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛i,j,T = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽12𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽16𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽18𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽19𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡   
The dependent variable is trading gains, which is measured as the semi-year change in 
percentage of shares outstanding held by fund multiplied by the buy-and-hold size-adjusted 
returns over the subsequent semi-year period. We use five alternative measures, i.e. analyst 
following, earnings volatility, related party transactions, intangible assets and SOE to proxy for 
firms’ opacity in Column (1), Column (2), Column (3), Column (4), and Column (5), 
respectively. Fewer Analysts is an indicator variable which equals one if the firm’s number of 
analyst following is less than the sample lower tertile during the year and zero otherwise; High 
Volatility is an indicator variable which equals one if the firm’s earnings volatility is higher 
than the sample upper tertile during the year and zero otherwise. Earnings volatility is measured 
as the standard deviation of ROA over the past three years; RPT is an indicator variable which 
equals one if the firm has related party sales and purchases during the year, and zero otherwise; 
More Intangible is an indicator variable which equals one if the firm’s intangible asset is greater 
than the sample upper tertile during the year and zero otherwise; SOE is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the company is a state-owned enterprise, and zero otherwise. In Column (6), 
we use a composite index to proxy for opacity. Composite Index is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the sum of indicator variables for five opaque measures including Fewer analysts, 
Higher Earnings Volatility, Existence of RPTs, More Intangible Assets, and SOE is higher than 
the sample upper tertile during the year and zero otherwise. The units of analysis are fund-
stock-years. Only stocks that are held by fund at the end of the year or at the end of the semi-
year are included in this sample. The sample contains 560,697 (557,760 in Panel C) fund-stock 
pairs across all the years in the sample period after dropping observations without necessary 
variables used in the regression analysis. The definitions of the variables are shown in the 
Appendix. The t-values in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for fund-level 
clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Dependent Variable = Trading Gains 
VARIABLES  
Fewer Analysts 
Higher Earnings 
Volatility  
Existence of 
RPTs 
More Intangible 
Assets  
 
SOE 
 
Composite Index  
Shared Office×Opaque 0.232** 0.230** 0.293** 0.315*** 0.193** 0.449***  
(2.375) (2.006) (2.363) (3.565) (2.291) (4.798) 
Opaque  -0.023 -0.012 -0.040** -0.053*** -0.006 -0.028  
(-0.865) (-0.635) (-2.146) (-2.989) (-0.370) (-1.241) 
Shared Office 0.056 -0.011 -0.169 -0.005 -0.028 -0.155***  
(1.231) (-0.233) (-1.501) (-0.112) (-0.464) (-2.721) 
Size 0.058*** 0.044** 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.060***  
(2.743) (1.980) (2.917) (2.632) (2.732) (2.835) 
Analyst Following 0.015 0.021** 0.025** 0.022** 0.021** 0.022**  
(1.080) (2.172) (2.562) (2.228) (2.122) (2.077) 
BM 0.159*** 0.110* 0.165*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.154**  
(2.714) (1.767) (2.793) (2.646) (2.665) (2.537) 
ROA 0.440* 0.379 0.466** 0.424* 0.456* 0.422*  
(1.885) (1.629) (1.995) (1.806) (1.953) (1.806) 
Leverage -0.178*** -0.173*** -0.144*** -0.178*** -0.174*** -0.172***  
(-3.164) (-2.970) (-2.587) (-3.150) (-3.090) (-2.994) 
Turnover 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***  
(4.965) (4.679) (4.804) (4.922) (4.972) (4.860) 
Return -0.036 -0.049** -0.052** -0.036 -0.037 -0.053**  
(-1.476) (-1.989) (-2.107) (-1.483) (-1.486) (-2.132) 
Std Dev 0.104 0.215 0.193 0.112 0.093 0.216  
(0.532) (1.094) (0.997) (0.578) (0.477) (1.114) 
SOE 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.026* -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.011) (-0.101) (0.028) (1.693) (-0.245) 
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Top10 0.025 0.034** 0.032** 0.027* 0.058** 0.042*** 
 (1.631) (2.107) (2.069) (1.696) (2.136) (2.664) 
Fund Size 0.057** 0.060** 0.054** 0.057** 0.038 0.058**  
(2.130) (2.166) (2.030) (2.129) (0.810) (2.128) 
Family Size 0.038 0.031 0.017 0.037 -0.058 0.012  
(0.805) (0.645) (0.367) (0.796) (-0.396) (0.248) 
Fund Performance -0.057 -0.088 -0.060 -0.057 -0.017*** -0.093  
(-0.395) (-0.641) (-0.410) (-0.392) (-7.486) (-0.673) 
Holding Size -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.001 -0.016***  
(-7.482) (-7.159) (-7.280) (-7.482) (-0.327) (-6.890) 
Family Fund Holding -0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.006 -0.002  
(-0.345) (0.393) (-0.835) (-0.323) (0.228) (-0.532) 
Same Region 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.007 -1.852 0.019  
(0.250) (0.243) (0.410) (0.278) (-1.189) (0.721) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 560,697 541,369 557,760 560,697 560,697 538,642 
Adjusted R-squared 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
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Table 6: Auditors’ Benefits: Audit Fees 
 
This table presents the regression results of funds’ auditor’s number (value) of listed firms 
audited and the fund’s audit fees based on the following regression: 
𝐿𝑛𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑗,𝑡(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑗,𝑡) + β2𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡
+ β3𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + β4𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + β5𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡
+ β6𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + β7𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑝 10𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡   
The dependent variable is the fund’s audit fees, measured as the natural logarithm of audit fees 
for fund j in year t. The units of analysis are fund-years. The sample contains 8,492 fund-years 
across our sample period after dropping observations without necessary variables used in the 
regression analysis. The definitions of the variables are shown in the Appendix. The t-values in 
parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for fund-level clustering. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Dependent Variable=LnFee 
Connected Firms 0.002**  0.002**   
(2.179)  (2.006)  
Connected Firm Value  0.002***  0.001*  
 (3.013)  (1.863) 
Fund Size 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.071*** 0.072***  
(39.442) (39.396) (8.917) (9.024) 
Fund Performance -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000  
(-2.081) (-2.068) (-0.292) (-0.287) 
Family Size -0.016*** -0.016*** 0.012 0.012  
(-4.258) (-4.225) (0.960) (0.984) 
Family Performance 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
(0.034) (0.100) (-1.440) (-1.430) 
Auditor Tenure 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.009** 0.009**  
(15.956) (15.722) (2.074) (2.118) 
Fund Top10 0.151*** 0.148*** -0.019 -0.018  
(5.041) (4.912) (-0.510) (-0.473) 
Fund Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,279 8,279 8,279 8,279 
Adjusted R-squared 0.522 0.522 0.800 0.800 
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Table 7: The Effect of Audit Fees on the Role of Shared Auditor 
 
This table presents the regression results of effects of funds’ audit fees on association between 
funds’ trading gains and shared auditor based on the following regression: 
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛i,j,T = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽12𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽16𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽18𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽19𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The dependent variable is trading gains, which is measured as the semi-year change in 
percentage of shares outstanding held by fund multiplied by the buy-and-hold size-adjusted 
returns over the subsequent semi-year period. Only stocks that are held by fund at the end of 
the year or at the end of the subsequent semi-year are included in this sample. The sample size 
is 558,201 across all the years in the sample period after dropping observations without 
necessary variables used in the regression analysis. The definitions of the variables are shown 
in the Appendix. The t-values in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for fund-
level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Dependent Variable = Trading Gains 
Shared Office×High Fee 0.218***   
(2.858)  
High Fee -0.022   
(-0.396)  
Shared Office×High Abnormal Fee  0.161** 
  (2.029) 
High Abnormal Fee  -0.061 
  (-1.608) 
Shared Office -0.022 0.020  
(-0.435) (0.329) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Observations 558,201 558,201 
Adjusted R-squared 0.009 0.009 
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Table 8: Shared Auditors and Audit Quality  
 
The table presents the regression results of association between shared auditors and audit 
quality based on the following regression: 
𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = β0 + β1𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + β2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + β2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + β4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + β5𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ β6𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + β7𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + β8𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + β9𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + β10𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ β11𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + β12𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + β13𝑇𝑜𝑝 10𝑖,𝑡 + β14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
The dependent variable is audit quality, which is measured as absolute value of abnormal 
accruals and likelihood of financial reporting irregularity for firm i in year t. The units of 
analysis are firm-years. The sample contains 14,627 firm-years across our sample period after 
dropping observations without necessary variables used in the regression analysis. The 
definitions of the variables are shown in the Appendix. The t-values in parentheses are based 
on standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for firm-year in audit-quality model  
N Mean Std P25 Median P75 
AbsDA_KWL 14,627 0.055 0.053 0.018 0.039 0.073 
AbsDA_DD 14,627 0.039 0.041 0.013 0.028 0.052 
Irregularity 14,627 0.115 0.318 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fund Office  14,627 0.123 0.328 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LnAsset 14,627 22.880 1.039 22.150 22.750 23.470 
ROA 14,627 0.042 0.051 0.015 0.037 0.066 
Leverage 14,627 0.468 0.204 0.312 0.475 0.626 
Loss 14,627 0.082 0.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales Turnover  14,627 0.669 0.470 0.352 0.555 0.836 
BM 14,627 0.546 0.254 0.342 0.522 0.739 
RECINV 14,627 0.268 0.176 0.133 0.242 0.370 
CFO 14,627 0.050 0.076 0.007 0.048 0.094 
Growth 14,627 0.199 0.444 -0.014 0.125 0.295 
Return 14,627 0.400 0.796 -0.144 0.194 0.717 
Age 14,627 2.230 0.630 1.792 2.398 2.773 
Top10 14,627 0.508 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Fund Share 14,627 0.077 0.106 0.007 0.031 0.101 
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Panel B: Regression Results  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 AbsDA_DD AbsDA_KWL Irregularity 
Fund Office -0.002** -0.003** -0.417*** 
 (-2.239) (-2.337) (-4.664) 
LnAsset 0.002*** -0.002** -0.200*** 
 (3.045) (-2.276) (-3.656) 
ROA 0.171*** 0.112*** -2.199*** 
 (4.400) (7.252) (-2.746) 
Leverage 0.008*** 0.034*** 1.653*** 
 (3.525) (10.570) (6.121) 
Loss 0.048*** 0.013*** 0.439*** 
 (9.849) (5.282) (4.184) 
Sales Turnover 0.004** 0.004*** -0.011 
 (2.479) (3.203) (-0.107) 
BM -0.028*** -0.016*** -0.437* 
 (-8.103) (-6.311) (-1.706) 
RECINV -0.004 0.012** -0.391 
 (-1.584) (2.385) (-1.383) 
CFO -0.048*** -0.034*** -1.163** 
 (-5.927) (-3.919) (-2.340) 
Growth 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.229*** 
 (9.785) (9.978) (4.027) 
Return 0.001 0.003** 0.064* 
 (0.457) (2.249) (1.933) 
Age 0.003*** 0.000 -0.090 
 (4.639) (0.432) (-0.981) 
Top10 -0.001 -0.002** -0.058 
 (-1.426) (-2.392) (-0.896) 
Fund Share -0.011** 0.003 -1.201** 
 (-2.495) (0.549) (-2.444) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,627 14,627 14,627 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared  0.157 0.102 0.065 
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Table 9: Shared Auditors and Funds’ Holding Decisions 
This table presents the regression results of funds’ holding decisions on shared auditor between fund and 
listed firms based on the following regression: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽16𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
The definitions of the variables are shown in the Appendix. The units of analysis are fund-stock-years. 
The sample contains 310,778 fund-stock pairs across all the years in the sample period after dropping 
observations without necessary variables used in the regression analysis. The t-values in parentheses are 
based on standard errors adjusted for fund-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Dependent Variable = Proportion 
Shared Office 0.203*** 0.068***  
(9.404) (4.348) 
Size 0.201*** 0.235***  
(16.286) (29.142) 
Analyst Following 0.198*** 0.059***  
(26.728) (12.745) 
BM -0.202*** 0.023  
(-6.675) (1.094) 
ROA 0.585*** 0.621***  
(6.785) (9.815) 
Leverage 0.147*** 0.090***  
(5.963) (4.659) 
Turnover 0.006*** 0.009***  
(3.542) (7.906) 
Return 0.005 0.019***  
(0.666) (3.145) 
Std Dev -1.017*** -0.308*** 
 (-13.698) (-5.664) 
SOE -0.037*** -0.052***  
(-3.700) (-7.101) 
Top10 -0.022*** -0.002 
 (-3.243) (-0.279) 
Fund Size 0.007 -0.038**  
(0.429) (-2.123) 
Family Size -0.124*** -0.058*  
(-4.589) (-1.921) 
Fund Performance 0.235*** 0.061  
(3.512) (1.434) 
Holding Size 0.032*** 0.039***  
(9.579) (15.945) 
Family Fund Holding -0.039*** -0.013***  
(-18.251) (-8.748) 
Same Region 0.041** 0.028***  
(2.564) (3.005) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects  No Yes 
Observations 310,778 310,778 
Adjusted R-squared 0.082 0.373 
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Table 10: Shared Auditors and Funds’ Trading Behaviors  
 
This table presents the regression results of association between funds’ holding changes and 
shared auditor between fund and listed firms held by the fund and association between funds’ 
informed trading and shared auditor based on the following two regressions: 
∆𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽16𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
∆𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽15𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽18𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽19𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡   
The dependent variables are absolute value of trading magnitude in Column (1), trading 
magnitude of net buy in Column (2), and trading magnitude of net sell in Column (3) of Panel 
A. The dependent variables are trading magnitude based on the holding shares change in Panel 
B. We restrict the fund sample with at least one stock with shared auditor and at least one stock 
without shared auditor in a given period. The units of analysis are fund-stock-years. Only stocks 
that are held by fund at the end of the year or at the end of the semi-year are included in this 
sample. The sample contains 456,240 fund-stock pairs across all the years in the sample period 
after dropping observations without necessary variables used in the regression analysis. The 
definitions of the variables are shown in the Appendix. The t-values in parentheses are based 
on standard errors adjusted for fund-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Panel A: Shared Auditor and Funds’ Trading Magnitude  
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Abs(△Holding) △Holding>0 △Holding<0 
Shared Office 0.013*** 0.008*** -0.010***  
(5.259) (3.202) (-4.344) 
Size 0.035*** 0.030*** -0.032***  
(19.377) (19.386) (-18.608) 
Analyst Following 0.001 0.000 -0.000  
(1.500) (0.628) (-0.541) 
BM 0.080*** 0.079*** -0.076***  
(16.042) (16.036) (-14.429) 
ROA -0.191*** -0.155*** 0.181***  
(-16.152) (-13.495) (15.454) 
Leverage -0.035*** -0.028*** 0.030***  
(-12.108) (-9.768) (9.761) 
Turnover 0.004*** 0.003*** -0.003***  
(16.082) (14.724) (-14.161) 
Return -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.006***  
(-6.208) (-5.582) (5.523) 
Std Dev 0.008 0.034*** 0.014*  
(1.077) (3.794) (1.771) 
SOE -0.014*** -0.013*** 0.012***  
(-13.474) (-12.024) (10.804) 
Top10 0.007*** 0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (10.236) (6.130) (-7.688) 
Fund Size 0.017*** 0.011*** -0.022***  
(4.851) (3.269) (-6.336) 
Family Size 0.012* 0.004 -0.017***  
(1.890) (0.643) (-2.940) 
Fund Performance 0.008 -0.003 -0.017* 
 (0.838) (-0.290) (-1.825) 
Holding Size 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004***  
(6.946) (-5.862) (-12.616) 
Family Fund Holding -0.001*** 0.000 0.002***  
(-5.142) (0.677) (8.226) 
Same Region 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.003**  
(3.528) (3.214) (-2.336) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 456,240 215,766 240,474 
Adjusted R-squared 0.356 0.374 0.415 
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Panel B: Shared Auditor and Funds’ Informed Trading 
  Dependent Variable=△Holding 
VARIABLES Perf=ΔROA Perf=UE Perf=BHAR 
Performance 0.186*** 0.101*** -0.000  
(9.853) (5.285) (-0.220) 
Shared Office×Performance 0.216*** 0.304*** 0.012*  
(2.688) (3.422) (1.839) 
Shared Office -0.005 -0.009*** 0.001  
(-1.561) (-2.696) (0.478) 
Size -0.001* -0.002** -0.001**  
(-1.898) (-2.377) (-2.024) 
Analyst Following -0.001** -0.001 -0.000  
(-2.035) (-1.274) (-0.179) 
BM 0.012*** 0.004 0.009***  
(3.782) (1.444) (2.858) 
ROA -0.014 0.023*** 0.034***  
(-1.452) (2.863) (4.212) 
Leverage 0.002 0.000 0.000  
(1.002) (0.112) (0.074) 
Turnover -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(-6.266) (-6.680) (-6.513) 
Return -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005***  
(-6.108) (-5.681) (-5.494) 
Std Dev 0.024*** 0.020** 0.019**  
(2.740) (2.362) (2.187) 
SOE 0.000 0.000 0.000  
(0.504) (0.432) (0.547) 
Top10 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.170) (-1.280) (-1.389) 
Fund Size -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015***  
(-5.530) (-5.538) (-5.535) 
Family Size -0.005 -0.005 -0.005  
(-1.467) (-1.470) (-1.486) 
Fund Performance -0.013* -0.013* -0.013* 
 (-1.680) (-1.681) (-1.705) 
Holding Size -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***  
(-20.868) (-20.881) (-20.878) 
Family Fund Holding 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
(10.821) (10.812) (10.797) 
Same Region 0.001 0.001 0.001  
(0.730) (0.601) (0.751) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 456,240 456,240 456,240 
Adjusted R-squared 0.035 0.035 0.035 
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Table 11: The Effect of Firms’ Negative Information on Fund’s Trading Gains 
 
This table presents the regression results of effects of listed firms’ negative information on 
association between funds’ trading gains and shared auditor based on the following regression: 
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛i,j,T = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑡𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽12𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽16𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽18𝐹𝑎𝑚 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽19𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The dependent variable is trading gains, which is measured as the semi-year change in 
percentage of shares outstanding held by fund multiplied by the buy-and-hold size-adjusted 
returns over the subsequent semi-year period. We define the company has negative information 
if its ROA at the end of the year is less than that at the end of semi-year. The units of analysis 
are fund-stock-years. Only stocks that are held by fund at the end of the year or at the end of 
the subsequent semi-year are included in this sample. The sample contains 560,697 fund-stock 
pairs across all the years in the sample period after dropping observations without necessary 
variables used in the regression analysis. The definitions of the variables are shown in the 
Appendix. The t-values in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for fund-level 
clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Negative=1 Negative =0 Full Sample 
Shared Office×Negative   0.342**  
  (1.988) 
Negative   0.014  
  (0.488) 
Shared Office 0.464*** 0.068* 0.067  
(2.610) (1.675) (1.640) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 65,928 494,769 560,697 
Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.008 0.009 
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Table 12: Effects of Social Ties between Fund’s Partners and Firm’s Partners 
 
This table presents the regression results of social ties between fund’s partners and firm’s 
partners in the shared office and fund’s trading gains. The units of analysis are fund-stock-years. 
The dependent variable is trading gains, which is measured as the semi-year change in 
percentage of shares outstanding held by fund multiplied by the buy-and-hold size-adjusted 
returns over the subsequent semi-year period. Only stocks that are held by fund at the end of 
the year or at the end of the subsequent semi-year are included in this sample. The definitions 
of the variables are shown in the Appendix. The t-values in parentheses are based on standard 
errors adjusted for fund-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Dependent Variable=Trading Gains 
Trading Gains  Shared Office ties 0.586*** 0.611***  
(2.928) (3.039) 
Shared Office no ties 0.099** 0.091** 
 (2.438) (2.242) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects  No Yes 
Observations 559,935 559,935 
Adjusted R-squared 0.005 0.009 
F-test:  5.60** 6.38** 
Shared Office ties =Shared Office no ties P=0.0180 P=0.0117 
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Table 13: Effects of Shared Audit Firm versus Shared Audit Office 
 
This table presents the results of effects of shared audit firms. The units of analysis are fund-
stock-years. The dependent variable is trading gains, which is measured as the semi-year change 
in percentage of shares outstanding held by fund multiplied by the buy-and-hold size-adjusted 
returns over the subsequent semi-year period. Only stocks that are held by fund at the end of 
the year or at the end of the subsequent semi-year are included in this sample. The definitions 
of the variables are shown in the Appendix. The t-values in parentheses are based on standard 
errors adjusted for fund-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for shared audit firm  
VARIABLES N Mean Std Dev P25 P50 P75 
Shared Audit Firm 560,697 0.049 0.217 0 0 0 
Shared Office 560,697 0.045 0.206 0 0 0 
Shared Audit Firm Not Office 560,697 0.005 0.069 0 0 0 
 
Panel B: Funds’ Trading Gains  
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Dependent Variable = Gains 
Shared Audit Firm  0.076**   
(2.012)  
Shared Office  0.104*** 
  (2.625) 
Shared Audit Firm Not Office  -0.170 
  (-1.519) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Fund Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Observations 560,697 560,697 
Adjusted R-squared 0.009 0.009 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition  
Fund Behavior Variables  
 
Dependent Variables  
 
Trading Gains  Change in percentage of shares outstanding held by fund 
(times 100) multiplied by the buy-and-hold size-adjusted 
returns (times 100) over the subsequent semi-annual period. 
Δ Gains  The change in fund’s trading gains for a firm from year t-1 to 
year t  
Proportion  The percentage of fund’s holding amount for listed firm as a 
fraction of the fund’s NAV 
ΔHolding Change in percentage of shares outstanding held by the fund, 
compared with last semi-annual period, times 100 
Abs(ΔHolding) Absolute value of change in percentage of shares outstanding 
held by the fund, compared with last semi-annual period, times 
100 
Test Variables  
 
Shared Office  An indicator variable that equals one if the fund shares the 
same audit office with the firm in its stock holding and zero 
otherwise  
Δ Shared Office The change in indicator variable shared office from year t-1 to 
year t 
Shared to Non-Shared An indicator variable that equals one if the fund and firm in 
fund’s stock holding shared the same office in year t-1, but not 
share the same office in year t, and zero otherwise  
Non-Shared to Shared  An indicator variable that equals one if the fund and firm in 
fund’s stock holding did not share the same office in year t-1, 
but share the same office in year t, and zero otherwise 
Variable for Opaqueness  
Fewer Analysts An indicator variable which equals one if the firm’s number of 
analyst following is less than the sample lower tertile during 
the year and zero otherwise 
Higher Earnings 
Volatility  
An indicator variable which equals one if the firm’s earnings 
volatility is higher than the sample upper tertile during the year 
and zero otherwise. Earnings volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation of ROA over the past three years.  
Existence of RPTs An indicator variable which equals one if the firm has related 
party sales and purchases during the year, and zero otherwise. 
More Intangible Assets An indicator variable which equals one if the firm’s intangible 
asset is greater than the sample upper tertile during the year 
and zero otherwise.  
SOE An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a state-
owned enterprise, and zero otherwise.  
Composite Index  An indicator variable that equals one if the sum of indicator 
variables for five opaque measures including Fewer analysts, 
Higher Earnings Volatility, Existence of RPTs, More Intangible 
Assets, and SOE is higher than the sample upper tertile during 
the year and zero otherwise.  
UE unexpected earnings, the difference between actual earnings 
per share (EPS) minus EPS in lagged semi-annual period, 
scaled by closing stock price at the end of the year 
ΔROA The change in ROA in the forthcoming earnings 
announcement, compared with ROA in lagged semi-annual 
period.  
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BHAR The buy-and-hold size-adjusted abnormal return in the 
subsequent semi-annual period  
Size  The natural logarithm of the equity’s market value during the 
year  
Analyst Following  The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts 
following the stock during the year 
BM The ratio of book value to market value of the firm during the 
year 
ROA Operating net income scaled by total assets during the year 
Leverage  Total liabilities scaled by total assets during the year  
Turnover  Trading volume scaled by the total outstanding shares of the 
company during the year.  
Return Cumulative raw return in the 12 months ending during the  
year 
Std Dev Standard deviation of monthly returns during the year.  
Top10 An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is audited by a 
Top 10 auditor based on total client assets during the year, and 
zero otherwise. 
Fund Size  The natural logarithm of total market value of all stocks held by 
the fund during the year  
Family Size The natural logarithm of total market value of all stocks held 
by the fund family during the year 
Fund Performance  The growth rate of its unit net value during the year  
Holding Size Natural logarithm of the market value of stock i held by the 
fund during the year  
Family Fund Holding  The percentage of shares outstanding held by the funds in the 
same family during the year  
Same Region  An indicator variable that equals one if the fund is located in 
the same province as the firm and zero otherwise  
Negative  An indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s operating 
performance declines in the forthcoming earnings 
announcement, compared with the operating performance in 
the last semi-annual period, and zero otherwise 
Shared Office ties An indicator variable that equals one if the fund shares the 
same audit office with the firm in its stock holding and the 
fund’s partners and firm’s partners have common alma mater, 
and zero otherwise.  
Shared Office no ties An indicator variable that equals one if the fund shares the 
same audit office with the firm in its stock holding and the 
fund’s partners and firm’s partners do not have common alma 
mater, and zero otherwise. 
Shared Audit Firm  An indicator variable that equals one if the fund shares the 
same audit firm with the firm in its stock holding and zero 
otherwise  
Shared Audit Firm Not 
Office  
An indicator variable that equals one if the fund shares the 
same audit firm but not the same office with the firm in its 
stock holding and zero otherwise  
Δ X The change in control variables used in regression analysis 
from year t-1 to year t 
Fund Audit-Fees Model   
LnFee Natural logarithm of the fund’s audit fees during the year. 
Connected Firms Natural logarithm of one plus the number of firms that share 
the same auditor with the fund during the year  
Connected Firm Value  Total holding proportion based on net asset value of the stocks 
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that share the same audit office with the mutual funds during 
the year, times 100. 
Family Performance  The performance of the mutual fund family, which is estimated 
as the asset-weighted average performance of all mutual funds 
affiliated to the mutual fund family. 
Auditor Tenure  The number of years that the auditor audited the fund  
Fund Top10  An indicator variable that equals one if the fund is audited by 
one of top10 auditors and zero otherwise  
High Fee An indicator variable which equals one if audit fee paid by 
fund is greater than the sample median value during the year 
and zero otherwise. 
High Abnormal Fee An indicator variable which equals one if abnormal audit fee 
paid by fund is greater than the sample median value during 
the year and zero otherwise. Abnormal fee is estimated 
residuals based on model in Table 6 excluding interested 
variables (i.e. Connected Firms or Connected Firm value).  
Audit-Quality Model 
 
AbsDA_DD Absolute value of abnormal accruals following Dechow and 
Dichev (2002). It is the absolute value of the residual from the 
following regression for each year and each industry that has 
at least 20 observations: TAi,t = α0 + α1CFOi,t-1 + α2CFOi,t + 
α3CFOi,t+1 + α4∆Sales,t+ α5PPEi,t+εi,t 
AbsDA_KWL Absolute value of abnormal accruals following Kothari et al. 
(2005). It is the absolute value of the residual from the 
following regression for each year and each industry that has 
at least 20 observations: TAi,t = α0 + α11/ASSETi,t-1 + α2 
ΔSALESi,t-1 + α3PPE i,t-1 + α4ROAi,t-1 +εi,t 
Irregularity   An indicator variable that equals one if firm conducted 
financial reporting irregularity sanctioned by regulators in the 
subsequent periods, and zero otherwise  
Fund Office  An indicator variable that equals one if the firm's audit office 
also audits any of funds that holds the stocks of the firm and 
zero otherwise  
LnAsset The natural logarithm of the total asset of firm during the year 
Loss An indicator variable that equals one if the firm reports a 
negative net income and zero otherwise  
Sales Turnover  Sales scaled by total assets 
RECINV Accounts receivable and inventory scaled by total assets 
during the year  
CFO Operating cash flows scaled by total assets during the year 
Growth  Sales growth, measured as the change in sales scaled by sales 
last year  
Age The natural logarithm of one plus the number of years that the 
firm is listed on the stock exchange  
Fund Share The percentage of shares outstanding held by all the mutual 
fund during the year 
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